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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
Case No. 20050060-CA

vs.
OSCAR IVAN CORNEJO,
Defendant/Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Several points of law, all sufficient by themselves, support the trial court's
decision to dismiss this case with prejudice. First, the case was a question of mixed fact
and law, which demanded that the State put on all of its evidence at trial. The State came
unprepared to do so. Secondly, continuing the trial would have represented an
unconstitutional delay, in that a poor strategic decision on the case of the prosecutor was
the reason for dismissal, and the Defendant was there, ready to proceed on all evidence.
Third, the prosecutor was offered and refused the opportunity to bifurcate the charges and
try the Driving Under the Influence with Priors charge separately, and Defendant waived
his right to claim double jeopardy. Her refusal was unreasonable, and justified a
dismissal. And finally, the Prosecutor attempted to manipulate the judge into dismissing
with prejudice, as she was warned repeatedly that was the result, so that she could appeal
and hopefully get a new trial, complete with the witness she failed to subpoena.
Viewed in totality, the case was correctly dismissed with prejudice.

ARGUMENT
THE QUESTION BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT WAS A MIXED
QUESTION OF FACT AND LAW WHICH SHOULD HAVE BEEN
HEARD BEFORE THE JURY. THE TRIAL COURT DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE ONLY AFTER ACCEPTING THE STATE'S
ASSERTION THAT THE DEFENSE STRATEGY WAS ACTUALLY
A "MOTION TO SUPPRESS." HAD THE PROSECUTOR
ALLOWED THE CASE TO GO TO TRIAL WITHOUT INSISTING
UPON A DISMISSAL, ALL OF STATE'S EVIDENCE WOULD
HAVE COME IN AS A RESULT OF THE DEFENSE STRATEGY.
The State, while at the trial court level and in this appeal, has mischaracterized the
issues in order to portray the dismissal as one in which the judge errantly dismissed a
case. This case was not dismissed because the Defendant failed to raise a suppression
issue in compliance with Utah R. Crim. P. 12. The case was dismissed following an inchambers hearing which resulted in the judge's adopting the prosecutorial position that
the defense strategy was really just a "Motion to Suppress." According to the State, the
only real question for the court to examine was purely a legal issue of admissibility,
which was a waived defense because it had not been raised in pre-trial proceedings.
The court found that it was the state's burden to present evidence of admissibility,
(Tr. 36:16 - 37:2), and since the State was characterizing the strategy as a "Motion to
Suppress," the court would go ahead with a hearing on admissibility, prior to actually
empaneling the jury. The court made this decision despite the fact the Defendant had
failed to file an objection as to the admissibility of the evidence prior to the trial, as
provided by Utah R. Crim. P. 12(c)(1)(B). The court was within its authority to make
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such a ruling, pursuant to Utah R. Crim P. 12(f), which allows the court to grant relief
from compliance to the rule for good cause.
The good cause in this case was the fact the Defendant intended to use, as his
strategy, a showing to the jury that the arresting officer had engaged in several misdeeds
which could lead to the jury's finding that police misconduct, not the Defendant's own
behavior, was the animus for the arrest. The Defendant actually wanted the
circumstances of the arrest and the blood draw to come in, and needed them to come in to
illustrate his case. He then intended to object to them as part of his strategy, to lead the
jury to the conclusion that the arresting officer was acting inappropriately at the time of
the alleged drunken driving.
Defendant articulated this strategy, and repeatedly objected to the prosecutor's
assertion that it was a question of admissibility which was purely a legal issue reserved
for the court to decide. (Tr. 8: 17-22, 17: 6-13, 18:8-22, 29:14-16, 46:15 to 47:25)
In fact, the case, as counsel disclosed he intended to defend it, was a mixed
question of fact and law. The facts should have been heard at the trial, and then decided
upon by the judge as for admissibility. The Defendant's strategy was to ask,
substantively, "Was this entire arrest motivated by the Defendant's behavior, or by
inappropriate police behavior? (Tr. 10:19-11:14, 26:19- 27:5, 46:15 - 47:15, 52:7-13.)
The judge adopted the position of the prosecution, reducing the question to one of law,
"Are the toxicology reports properly admissible because they were properly obtained?"
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(Tr. 11:16.)
The Utah Supreme Court indicated in State of Utah v. Shayne M. Hansen, 2002
UT 125, 63 P.3d 650, 659 (2005) that mixed questions of fact and law are examined
giving some discretion to the district court's application of the law. The discretion
afforded varies, however, according to the issue being reviewed. When a case involves
consent to search, the appellate court will afford little discretion to the district court,
because there must be state-wide standards that guide law enforcement and prosecutorial
officials (citing State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1271 (Utah 1993)).
The state-wide standards for a search and seizure are the benchmark from which
the Defendant wanted to work, having the evidence of the stop come in, and letting the
jury decide if the search was driven by improper motives. The court could still have
decided that the search was unconstitutional, and stricken all of the evidence from the
record. Without hearing all of the factual evidence, though, the court could not have
applied the facts to the law and made an appropriate determination. Hansen, at 660,
articulates that
To determine whether a traffic stop was reasonable, we consider two
questions: "(1) Was the police officer's action justified at its inception? And
(2) Was the resulting detention reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances that justified the interference in the first place?" (quoting
State v. Lopez, 873 P. 2d 1127, 1131-32 (Utah 1994)).
Looking at this test, the prosecutor failed to subpoena the police officer who could
lay the foundation for the search and seizure of the blood which led to the toxicology
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reports. Without that testimony, part one of the reasonableness test could not be proven.
Prosecutorial error prevented the judge from making any other decision when he decided
to dismiss the case.
The Defendant has no disagreement with the state as to whether an impromptu
suppression hearing should have been held, as it was unreasonable to demand that the
prosecutor present her evidence in such a hearing.
The parmount issue is, though, that there was no need for a suppression hearing, as
the Defendant did not want anything suppressed. The State argues, at page 22 of its brief,
that a strategic decision should not be the basis for "cause" to excuse the latter challenge
pursuant to Rule 12(f). This argument must also fail, because the Defendant made no
strategic decision to challenge Rule 12(f). He wanted all of the evidence to come in. The
prosecutor initially agreed with that position. The prosecutor conceded the strategic
defense planned by the Defendant was appropriate, when the prosecutor stated
And I think if he's going to suggest that there's something improper, which
he may very well be able to do as a factual matter in front of a jury, I ought
to be able to defend it by saying this is exactly (unintelligible)- (emphasis
added)(Tr. 8:12-16.)
The defense strategy required, as proof, all of the surrounding circumstances
related to the blood draw to come into the trial. The objection as to the admissibility
which the Defendant planned to make would have been a moot point-as the matter would
have already been heard by the jury. The court could have immediately overruled any
i

objection by the Defense, as at least two witnesses-the sergeant of the arresting officer,
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and the state's toxicologist, would have already provided a foundation for the evidence,
and would have been cross-examined by the Defense. Certainly at that point-and as was
articulated by the defense counsel in chambers prior to trial-the Defendant would have
waived any objection to the evidence being heard because counsel would not have
objected to the witnesses.
In light of the Defendant's position, the trial court correctly insisted that the
prosecution be responsible for providing an evidentiary foundation for any evidence
which came in-regardless of whether or not there was an objection to such evidence. (Tr.
36:16-37:2.) Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure does not indicate that
failure to object to evidence by the Defendant permits the State to ignore the Rules of
Evidence. The Rules of Evidence exist to ensure the triers of fact and law receive a
proper foundation for proper conclusions based upon the evidence.
The prosecutor incorrectly assessed the question before the court, after already
conceding the Defendant had a right to defend his case as he planned. The prosecutor and
the trial court wrongly determined the defense was actually a "Motion to Suppress." The
judge believed the issue should go forward, with the State having the burden to produce
evidence to prove its stop, search, and seizure were all proper and not motivated by
inappropriate police behavior. As it were, as the prosecution was missing a link in its
evidentiary chain, the judge had no choice but to dismiss with prejudice.
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL
DELAY WAS CORRECT. REGARDLESS OF HOW PAST
-6-

CONTINUANCES ARE VIEWED, THE DEFENDANT WAS
PREPARED TO GO TO TRIAL, HAD SUFFERED THE
EMOTIONAL AND FINANCIAL IMPACT OF THE
PREPARATION, AND THE PROSECUTOR WAS SIMPLY
UNPREPARED TO PUT ON HER EVIDENCE.
The State makes a well-delivered presentation of the reason that any further delay
in the trial would not have been unconstitutional. However, its argument rests on the idea
that any further delay would be the Defendant's fault, because the "...defendant failed to
timely challenge the admission of his involuntary blood draw by September 1..." (Br. 17.)
This argument must fail because it is simply a fallacious representation of what
occurred. At no point in the record is there any evidence that the Defendant wanted a
suppression hearing. As explained above, the Defendant wanted the case to go forward,
and have all of the police behavior be put before the jury. It was the prosecutor and the
judge who termed the issue one of admissibility, and thus a suppression issue. (Tr. 5:13 7:21,8:17.)
Defendant agrees that the question of whether an unconstitutional delay has
occurred must be viewed by the totality of the circumstances. While Defendant does
concede that there was no objection to delays in the pre-trial process, a reading of the
marshalled record does indicate that the delays were domino-in-effect, because the
Weber County Attorney's office failed to deliver the tape of the arrest in a timely matter.
Whether Attorney Chad McKay had to continue hearings till he got past Scout Camp is
not the point. The point is that the continuances were necessary because the schedule got
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off in the first place when the tape was not delivered to the defendant, and the County
Attorney's office did not immediately determine which charges it would file. Attorney
Mckay would have been prepared to go forward as scheduled had the County not started
with the processing of fouling up the schedule.
Demanding that the Defendant would have objected to delays in the pre-trial, in
order to demonstrate unconstitutional delay, necessarily demands that Defendant could
have anticipated what would happen when he got to the court for his scheduled trial. The
Supreme Court said, "We reject, therefore, the rule that a defendant who fails to demand a
speedy trial forever waives his right." Barker v. Wingo, Warden, 407 U.S. 514 at 528
(1972). Defendant's actions were to cooperate with continuances needed because the
County Attorney did not quickly decide which charges should be filed and did not deliver
the arrest tape. The continuances should not be construed against the Defendant. They
should be viewed as supportive of his belief that a speedy trial would be provided.
Defendant had no reason to object to earlier delays, because he had no reason to suspect
that the prosecutor would come to the trial unprepared.
The cases upon which the State relies for support of its position on its
unreasonable delay/unavailable witness arguments can be largely distinguished. The
State uses Barker v. Wingo, Warden, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), to support its assertion that
unavailability of a witness is not a reason for unconstitutional delay. What the State fails
to mention is that the witness in Barker was planning to come, was subpoenaed, and
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developed an unforeseen illness which prevented his coming. Barker at 518. In the case
at bar, the witness was never subpoenaed to come to trial, because the prosecutor believed
his presence was unnecessary. In fact, she had never even talked to the "unavailable"
witness before that date. (Tr. at 33:19-23).
Similarly, in State v. Trafny, 799 P.2d 704 (Utah 1990), the situation again was
that the unavailable witness was the victim, who had been subpoenaed to appear. Trafny
consented to the continuance requested by the State because of the unavailable witness.
There was no consent to a continuance in this case. l
The term "unavailable" is not interpreted so broadly as to say that it covers
witnesses who were never ordered to show up. Interpretation as such would allow any
prosecutor to fail to subpoena a witness and then move for a continuance-which would be
taking advantage of a "strategic decision." The state admits that a "strategic decision"
should not be grounds for a dismissal, and should not as such be grounds for a
continuance. (Br. at 22.)
This Court should apply URE 804 (Hearsay), as a guideline for when a witness is
"unavailable," and compare it to the circumstances surrounding the prosecutor's
unavailable witness. The unavailable witness exemptions which would apply should be
J

It is conceded however, that a second trial date was set, another witness was
subpoenaed, and was unavailable. Trafny objected to a continuance, and the trial court
did dismiss without prejudice. Other circumstances following the dismissal differ enough
that this second delay is incomparable to the case in considering whether an
unconstitutional delay was committed. Trafny at 705.
-9-

one of the following, as per rule 804:
The unavailable witness should be...
1. Exempted by a rule of the court on the ground of privilege from testifying.
2. Persists in refusing to testify, despite an order of the court to do so.
3. Testifies as to a lack of memory of the subject matter.
4. Is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or then
existing physical or mental illness or infirmity.
None of the four conditions above apply to the State's unavailable witness. Rule
804 also provides that the witness is "not unavailable" as a witness if the absence is due
to the procurement or wrongdoing of the proponent of the statement for the purpose of
preventing the witness from attending or testifying.
In this case, the witness's lack of attendance was solely because of the failure of
procurement of the proponent of the testimony-the prosecutor's. The state had no
intention of having the witness testify. This error should be construed against the State,
and not against the Defendant. The trial court was justified in dismissing the case with
prejudice, as the State caused its own problems. The Defendant was there, prepared to
go to trial with all of the evidence against him.
THE DEFENDANT DOES NOT ARGUE WITH THE
PROSECUTOR'S POSITION THAT ORDINARILY, BIFURCATION
OF CRIMINAL CHARGES STEMMING FROM A SINGLE
CRIMINAL EPISODE WOULD BE IMPLAUSIBLE AND CREATE
DOUBLE JEOPARDY FOR THE DEFENDANT, IN THIS CASE,
HOWEVER, DEFENDANT WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO CLAIM
DOUBLE JEOPARDY BY NOT OBJECTING TO THE TRIAL
JUDGE'S OFFER TO BIFURCATE THE ISSUES AND ALLOW
TWO TRIALS.
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The transcript of the proceedings on the date of the trial indicate that the trial judge
offered the prosecutor the opportunity to bifurcate the charges against the Defendant, and
allow her to proceed later with the Driving Under the Influence with Priors charge. (Tr.
52:20 - 54:25) The Defendant agrees that normally this would constitute double jeopardy.
The transcript is also very clear that Attorney Chad McKay never objected to the
court's offer of bifurcation. The failure to object constituted a waiver of the Defendant of
the double jeopardy argument. Such a waiver is permitted under Barker, which defines
waiver as "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege."
Barker at 525, citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). Defense counsel's
professional decision to not object represented a clear waiver of the double jeopardy
argument.
Because the Defendant waived his double jeopardy right, the State could have
proceeded with two trials. The State declined its right to do so, and as such, waived its
right to appeal the dismissal with prejudice.
THE PROSECUTOR ATTEMPTED TO STRONG-ARM THE
JUDGE. SHE WAS GIVEN AMPLE OPPORTUNITIES TO
RECONSIDER HER POSITION TO NOT GO FORWARD WITH
HER CASE. SHE STIPULATED TO THE DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE.
Several times throughout the pre-trial proceedings, Prosecutor
Brenda Beaton was told that if she moved to dismiss the case, the case
would be dismissed with prejudice. (Tr. at pages 39, 40, 42, 55, 56.) She
essentially "dared" the judge to dismiss the case with prejudice, knowing
-11-

she could appeal the issue, as the State has done. Such was a strategic
decision in error on her part, and should not now be a basis for remanding
the case back for trial.
CONCLUSION
Because she failed to subpeona her own witness, because she declined the
opportunity to bifurcate the charges, and because she utterly failed to just go to trial with
the witnesses and case she had prepared, which very easily could have led to convictions
on all counts, this Court must view her actions as a stipulation to the judge's Dismissal
with prejudice. This case should remain dismissed, and not be remanded for trial.
Respectfully submitted October 28, 2005

ChaaB. Mckay
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of time and you can argue that that prejudices his case, but
that's the way the statute reads, you know, so -- if you
don't resolve it in some manner then I don't know how to tell
this jury what they're doing.

Otherwise, I tell them this is

a felony DUI but we are asking you only to determine whether
or not there's a basic violation of the DUI law in so -MR. MCKAY:

Yes.

It's my understanding that we had

agreed that -- and correct me if I'm wrong -- and that's why
I didn't have any problems with these -- this verdict form is
that I think you even sent over an instruction that if they
find him guilty of the DUI, that we will send them back into
the room to find the other elements and basically will be
certified but it's (unintelligible) -THE COURT:

Well, it's a -- it's a legal question if

you want make it such or I can send it back.

You see,

they -- if I take it from the jury, it has to be clearly
agreed that I can do that part of it separate from the jury.
Otherwise, I have to give it to the jury.

I don't have any

choice.
MR. MCKAY:
question but

Well, I don't think there's much

—

THE COURT:

Well, it's up to you.

MR. MCKAY:

—

THE COURT:

Chad, it's up to you to decide so

MR. MCKAYS

I have --

to prove that part of it so •—

5

MS. BEATON:

I think the other -- the other issue

is, is there1s a forced blood draw in this case, and the
forced blood draw was done because the defendant had six
priors within 10 years and he had just evaded the police and
they felt like it was an emergency situation.
THE COURT:
MS, BEATON:

So they did --

This is not a regular test?
No.

This was an initial refusal and

then they are telling him we're going to force the blood draw
then, and then he -- I mean, he does stick out his arm and
they don't have to hold him down or do anything, you know.
MR. MCKAY:

I'm going to argue a bunch of stuff on

that so —
MS. BEATON:

But so I think if he's going to

argue it -THE COURT:

Well, that a —

that's going to be

argued as a legal issue?
MR. MCKAY:

Yeah.

I'm not -- at least -- nothing is

perfect but I'm going to try not to bring up that
information.

I'm just going to go through the procedures and

policies, whether they followed them, on cross.
MS. BEATON:

That's --

And I think the problem is if there's a

suggestion by defense counsel that they improperly forced the
blood draw —
THE COURT: Uh-huh.
MS. BEATON:

Because this jury is going to think,

7

draw.

You had another motion but it didn't affect that blood

draw at all.
MR, MCKAY:

Well, we brought it up in the prelim.

You know, maybe Ifm not understanding.
THE COURT:

Well —

MR. MCKAY:

Are you talking about the supression

THE COURT:

At the supression hearing —

hearing?

MS. BEATON:

trial.

Wait.

Do you —

THE COURT:

-- it was never brought up.

MR. MCKAY:

Right.

We were just saving it for

That doesn't —
THE COURT:

Well, but it's a legal question as to

whether or not the blood draw is proper.

You see, if he had

had an opportunity to take a test, that legally can come in,
if he refuses.

There's a -- I think a very stat -- a clear

statutory provision that you can just mention that he
refused, basically.

But if you're going to contest the

validity of the blood draw, that is not a jury question.
That is a judge question.
MR. MCKAY:

Yeah.

All I'm saying is that —

THE COURT:

And so it would have to be heard outside

the hearing of the jurors, and this is a heck of a time to be
bringing it up.
MS. BEATON:

And frankly, the state's in a position
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instruct them that the blood draw is legal, basically, that
you know, would be the ultimate conclusion, if I determine it
is a legal blood draw.
MR. MCKAY:

I guess it's just —

THE COURT:

I don't know -- I haven't reviewed the

case that authorizes it for a long, long time.

I know there

are some very limited circumstances where they can draw blood
from a DUI suspect where he's in an emergency room as a
result of an accident, for example, I think there are some
cases that have held they can draw there for medical
purposes, and then it can be used for a DUI process, but the
exceptions are pretty limited, as I recall.
Brenda, what is your take on what the law allows in the
way of a blood draw?
MS. BEATON:

Bill has this issue right now and he

and I have been talking about this issue.

State versus

Rodriguez is the case that defines whether or not a blood
draw can be taken in an instance like this.

Because what

they did in Rodriguez was, they forced a blood draw of a
woman who had refused all the field sobrieties and all the
same sort of circumstances that we're dealing with here
although they didn't have an evading that proceeded it and
the Court then lists all these different factors. And I
guess my problem is I —
THE COURT:

But it was a forced blood draw on that
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improperly taken and I can give three specific reasons why it
was improperly taken, and then just let them be the judges
and the trier of fact on the —
issue.

it's a very factually-based

I don't think it's a legal issue —
THE COURT: But that's giving the jury the right to

make the legal decision on whether it's admissible.

If you

are willing to let that jury consider the results of a blood
draw as part of your strategy in this case and then argue
that, you know, they shouldn't give it any real weight
because of all the circumstances, which is what you'd like to
do, you're going to have to weigh that legal question as to
the admissibility.

Otherwise, I'm going to insist that it be

resolved outside the hearing of the jury on a basis of a
legal question.

If you want to let it in --

MR. MCKAY: Well, you —
THE COURT:

-- and then raise the problem, you lose

the right to appeal the admissibility of that evidence and
you can only argue to the jury then what weight do you want
to give it. But admissibility is a legal question and if you
want to give up your argument that it was illegally drawn so
you can argue that, you know, the oppressive police conduct,
the overzealous police work that was being done against your
client to his detriment, or whatever your theory is, which I
understand is basically that based on your previous —

you

know, the previous motion that I denied, then, you know,
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to —
MR. MCKAY:

Whether they followed the procedures or

THE COURT:

-- to get some evidence —

MR. MCKAY:

It shows his intent —

THE COURT:

Yeah.

not --

evidence in on it.

You might be able to get some

But as far as admissibility of a test,

it's a legal question.

The statute makes certain provisions

on how the Court can admit the results of a test that is
through the intoxalyzer or, you know, the blood alcohol
testing equipment that is used.
MR. MCKAY:

Maybe I don't understand.

saying that that's an option that they not?

If I say that I

waive that and they not present that evidence.
prove their case without that evidence?

Are you

How do they

Maybe I'm just not

understanding what you're saying.
MS. BEATON:

The judge is suggesting that

(unintelligible) -THE COURT: Well, I am saying that it's not a jury
question as to the admissibility of that test, and therefore,
it has to be decided by a judge outside the hearing of the
jury.

If I allow it in, then all of the circumstances are

probably going to be coming in.

If I deny it, then if you

raise the issue, you may open the door for them to get it in
in certain ways —

15

came back,

I've given him notice of expert, I've sent over

CVs, I've done all sorts of things to indicate to him at
least what my game plan was.
He and I have talked a few different times, and until
today is the first time hearing that now all of a sudden
we're going to talk about forced blood draw and we're going
to, you know, make it seem like it's a big deal and all -THE COURT:
MS. BEATON:
THE COURT:

Well -—
—

this kinda thing.
I'm not so concerned about the

forcing of the blood draw and all of that if there is no
objection to the test coming in.

If there is an objection to

the test coming in, that's a legal question I have to decide
outside the presence of the jury, and the jury doesn't need
to hear all the circumstances of it, then I would have to
decide that.

It doesn't sound like we're ready to go the

jury on that issue for sure.
If you're going to object to the admissibility of the
test, then I'm going to have to have a special hearing or I'm
going to have to fully hear this and review the law because,
you know, in our society in general you don't force people to
give blood to incriminate them criminally, unless you're
under one of the exceptions for a DNA draw or for some of the
other purposes that are permitted.

And a person can refuse

to take the test and then I instruct them that there was a
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MR. MCKAY:

-- it's not like this is new.

THE COURT:

We're only talking about —

MR. MCKAY:

You knew this was coming --

THE COURT:

We're only talking about the blood

alcohol.
MS. BEATON:

But the bottom line is we don't have a

trial today if you're going to object to the illegal
admissibility of the blood draw because that isn't something
that we just parade out in front of a jury.

That's something

that we all get to write briefs on. That's something that if
the Court rules against the state I think may be an
appealable issue for me, it might be an appealable issue for
you to go up on.
THE COURT:

Yeah.

I'm -- I'm not going to just go

and give that whole thing to the jury and then try to
instruct them what's admissible and what isn't.
MR. MCKAY:
MS. BEATON:

Yeah.

And I guess I see it differently.

And maybe this whole conversation

needs -THE COURT: And that's what you apparently assumed I
would do -MS. BEATON:

—

(unintelligible) is mute then

because the defendant (unintelligible) show up.
MR. MCKAY:
on —

Yeah.

I mean, my whole case is based
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THE CLERK:
MS. BEATON:
THE COURT:

I don't know «
And I don't know how that

—

Mr. Cornejo isn't going anywhere.

Hell,

he's been around long enough to get seven DUIs, you say?
MS. BEATQN:
THE COURT:
MS. BEATON:

Yeah.
He's going to stick around.
It's the Christmas season, he'll

probably be drunk and driving again.

State wants a bench

warrant if he doesn't show at the time of trial.
THE COURT:

Well, I'll give Mr. McKay time to get

him in for sure if he has to go pick him up.
MS. BEATON:

Well, isn't today D-Day, though?

I

mean, he doesn't know that we've got —
MR. MCKAY:

As far as I know --

THE COURT:

I'll decide that issue if we decide —

is he in there now -- I don't know.
MR. MCKAY:

We got to change this screen.

THE COURT:

But you know, I'm going to -- I'm going

to give Mr. McKay a chance to get him in before I have him
arrested.

He's shown up for his other hearings.

THE CLERK:

The defendant is here.

THE COURT:

He is?

THE CLERK:

He is.

THE COURT:

So it's a nonissue there.

going to have to address this other issue.

But we're

We got a couple
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the presence of a jury given the fact that it may deny the
evidence and then that leaves the state with one element that
they would have to determine if they're going to try and
prove, and that is if the defendant was impaired so that he
could not safely operate a motor vehicle under the statute
and get a conviction.
So the admissibility of the blood test is a critical
element of the state's case. And the state has indicated
they had previously given notice to Mr. McKay they intended
to put that in and they have their — what is it a doctor
lined up -MS. BEATON:
THE COURT:

Toxicologist.
-- or a technician, a toxicologist to

come in and testify about, I suppose, the blood draw and the
test itself.
MS. BEATON:
THE COURT:

And the result.
And the results and asserting that there

is a blood alcohol level above the .08 grams, I suppose.
So that being the case, the state -- or the Court has a
jury ready to go. Mr. McKay has indicated off the record,
and I want to make it a part of the record now that he is
ready to go to trial, his client is here and he wishes to go
to trial today on the issue and the state has objected to
going to trial today until the legal question of
admissibility by them can be resolved.

And I'd like to hear
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prepared its entire case on the premise that that evidence
would be included as testimony rather than we would have an
issue in front of the jury as to its admissibility.
The state's position is, is that if we're going to argue
this legal issue it's not something that can be readily done
this morning and then reconvene the jury this afternoon; one,
because research needs to be done by all three of the parties
involved in this; two, because it requires an evidentiary
hearing that requires the state to subpoena witnesses, some
of which have already been subpoenaed for the trial but
others of which the state would anticipate calling who are
not under subpoena by the state and whether or not their
availability is —

it is unknown at this point in time;

three, I think the state's position is, is that this is an
appealable issue, possibly by defense if the Court permits
the admissibility of the forced blood draw in and the
results; or two, that it would be situational possibly the
state could appeal this issue because it i's so critical for
determining the DUI in this particular case.
The state also feels like this is a situation where the
law does not permit defense counsel or the state to conduct a
trial by ambush.

And we have had a preliminary hearing,

we've had a pretrial and we've had a supression hearing, all
of which none of those have indicated to the state that
defense counsel was going to object to this blood draw until
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filed, it was brought up at the preliminary hearing, it was
not contested at the supression hearing and not mentioned as
any point of contention at any of the pretrials.

And today

the state was first informed by Mr. McKay that this was going
to be an issue right as we were standing out in the hallway
prior to the jury coming in.
THE COURT:

All right. Mr. McKay, would you like to

make a record and your -- regarding your position in this
matter.
MR. MCKAY:

Yes. Thank you, your Honor.

Throughout

this proceeding it's been fairly informal discovery.
cooperated, passed things back and forth.

We've

We haven't had

formal cut-off dates, we haven't had formal lists that have
gone out, we haven't even supplied each other with witness
lists.

I mean, it's been very informal.

not required in this case.

Proper notice is

Because for me to -- and as the

Court knows, I'm not required to show all of my case to the
prosecution, basically write out here, this is everything I'm
going to do, you go ahead and prepare a response to every
single thing, that's just not what the law requires.
The fact that in fact she sent the discovery to me that
she brought up, particularly what she's referring to are the
procedures for a forcible blood draw shows that it did come
up in the preliminary hearing —

in fact, I don't think she

was the one that did the prelim, I think it was Camille.
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the legal issue that the Court will rule on, but did he
follow the procedures, and I believe the trier of facts can
follow those points, yes or no.

And that's -- you know, we

believe he did violate them on at least three particulars but
it's up to the Court to rule whether that's -One other thing, and maybe this is just a legend that
passes around among the defense bar, but most defense
attorneys --my brother was a prosecutor and a judge and
they, at least in Arizona, prosecutors will not try cases
during December because they believe jurors for the will of
the season or whatever it is are more lenient.

And for that

matter -MS, BEATON:
MR. MCKAY:

Now wait a minute.
—

it would be prejudicial to my client

not to have the trial in the month of December but to bump it
off to when all the debts hit in February.
THE COURT:
MS. BEATON:

Well -That's a bunch of crap.

MR. MCKAY:

Whether it carries weight or not --

THE COURT:

Just a minute.

MR. MCKAY:

—

Just a minute.

I'm just telling you that's an

argument -THE COURT:

Yeah.

MR. MCKAY:

-- that it does tend to -- I mean,

That's —

that's —

prosecutors don't think about it but —

J

J
1
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their credit card debt it doesn't matter.
MR. MCKAY:

Or that they need to be shopping instead

of here listening to the case.
THE COURT:

Yeah.

Christmas that it's —

And we're far enough before

it's totally a nonfactor.

However, I do think it's an important legal issue, that
is my -- that's my concern on Ms. Beaton's side, it is an
important legal issue.

Strategically I understand where you

were coming -- are coming from and it isn't your obligation
totally to object in advance through motions in limine. The
problem is as a judge in managing the trial, I have to make
sure that it's done right and that the proper evidence gets
before the jury and the improper evidence doesn't get before
the jury.

It's a question of law as to whether or not under

certain facts a blood draw is permitted and then the evidence
obtained therefrom can be used by the prosecution.
I have to also factor in how difficult it is for me to
find trial dates for two days even, you know, to get cases
tried because we're heavily calendared and we've set aside
this date for the jury trial and I don't like to give up my
trial dates.
can.

I have to use as many days for the trials as I

I'm going to rule as follows:

We're going ahead with this trial today and I'm going to
excuse the jury until 1:30, we're going to have a hearing on
the legal and factual issues relating to this.

It's now
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MS. BEATON:

When are we going to have the

evidentiary hearing?
THE COURT:

Right now,

MR. MCKAY:

Do we need to go over the instructions?

THE COURT: Not now.
MR. MCKAY:

Okay.

THE COURT:

I'm going to excuse the jury for --

until 1:30, have them come back and then we're going to go
ahead and try this case.
(The following was held in open court.)
THE COURT:

Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury panel,

you've been summoned in today to hear a case that is going to
go for today and tomorrow, a criminal case. And we have
determined -- or I have determined this morning that there
are some issues that are purely legal that I need to resolve
with the parties before we actually proceed with the trial.
Now, that being the case, I'm going to take the rest of
this morning to resolve those legal questions that exist.
And I'm going to have the jury panel come back at 1:30 and we
will proceed with the trial. We still should be able to be
done by tomorrow evening.
Now, the only question I'm going to ask any of you right
now is are there any of you who have a -- an extremely dire
emergency of some sort that would prevent you from being
involved with the court for the next two days?

Other issues
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Honor, I think you've already heard what the state's position
is.

That's the problem that we're having here.

The state

feels like it's not prepared, this is an issue that the
Court's already indicated it's not prepared for so I don't
know why -THE COURT:
issue.

Well, I'm not going to reargue that

I just want to know how many witnesses you're going

to need to call, who they are and let's see if we can help
you to get them here as soon as possible.
MS. BEATON:

Well, I need two witnesses right now,

one witness who is not even under subpoena which is the
sergeant who authorized this.
THE COURT: Well, that one perhaps I can allow in
through a hearsay basis but let's -- the other witness, when
were they due?
MS. BEATON:

Well, the other witness obviously is

going to be the trooper.
THE COURT: Okay.
MS. BEATON:

So he's here.

state has is I don't know what the —

But problem is that the
I haven't even had a

discussion with Brad H o m e as to what the mental thoughts
were that he was having when he instructed Trooper Jones to
make sure that a forced blood draw takes place.
THE COURT:
MS. BEATON:

All right.
But troo — but Sergeant H o m e is the
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THE CLERK:

For the record we'll call State of Utah

versus Oscar Ivan Cornejo, case number 041900798,
THE COURT:
MS. BEATON:

All right.

The state may proceed.

Your Honor, if I may, the —

I have

pulled the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
THE COURT: Uh-huh.
MS. BEATON:

Rule 12 under motions.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.
MS. BEATON:

It indicates the following shall be

raised at least five days prior to trial, this is subsection
C, sub 1, sub B, which indicates that, A motion to suppress
evidence shall be -- shall be brought before the court at
least five days prior to trial.

Subsection A indicates, An

application to a court for an order shall be by motion,
which, unless made during the trial or hearing, shall be in
writing and in accordance with this rule.

A motion shall

state succinctly and with particularity the grounds upon
which it is made and the relief sought.

A motion need not be

accompanied by a memorandum unless required by the Court.
The state's position is, is that this motion has -- is
requesting a supression of evidence of the admissibility of
the blood draw and it should have been raised at least five
days prior to trial and has not been raised five days to
trial.

The state is not prepared to go forward today and is

not prepared on this legal issue.
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THE COURT:

Itfs your burden, not the defensefs

burden to be certain that the evidence is admissible.
MS. BEATON:

Well, even if it's my burden, under

this scenario, Rule 12 required me to file something in
writing which I have not done, which I am prepared to do.
THE COURT:

Well, that's not the way I read it so

you can go ahead and -MS. BEATON:

Your Honor, at this time the state

moves to dismiss.
THE COURT:

Denied.

This jury is here to try this

case.
MS. BEATON:
THE COURT:

Your Honor, with all due respect —
If I dismiss -- let me say, I may

admit -- I may allow that but it would be with prejudice.
MS. BEATON:

Your Honor, I've also --

THE COURT:

We're ready to go to trial.

MS. BEATON:

-- looked at that. Rule 25 indicates

the dismissal without trial, when that can be done and
whether or not it can be done with prejudice.

The only

option that would apply is whether or not the Court believes
that there is unconstitutional delay in bringing the
defendant to trial. And I believe as we've indicated early I
don't think that the Court can make a finding that the state
is trying to delay this matter for no reason.
The state wants to be prepared on this legal issue
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defense counsel did not bring that issue at the supression
hearing.
THE COURT:

Nor did the state ever bring it before

the Court.
MS. BEATON:
THE COURT:

I agree.
We're going to go to trial today, that's

denied.
MS, BEATON:
THE COURT:

Your Honor -If I dismiss it, it would have to be

upon your agreement to dismiss with prejudice, I can do that.
MS. BEATON:

I think the one thing that I get to do

is I get to dismiss this case if I want to as part of the
executive branch.

The Court has the liberty then to

determine if it's going to be a dismissal with prejudice but
the state would ask for findings that it's being made based
on unconstitutional delay.
THE COURT:
possibly be.

It isn't.

I'm just -- well, it could

But I -- what I'm saying is the parties are

here, ready for trial, you should be prepared to go to trial
today and you've had ample notice of this trial date.
am —

And I

the defense has mentioned in chambers they want the

trial today, they're here ready to go, and so we'll either
have the trial today or you can move to dismiss it without
prejudice -- or with prejudice.
MS. BEATON:

I — with all due respect to the Court,
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may present the evidence concerning this blood draw and I'll
make a decision on whether it's admissible.
MS. BEATON:

But I think what the Court — what the

state is saying, your Honor, is the state is not prepared to
make this legal argument today.

Because if the Court denies

the admissibility of this evidence —
THE COURT:

That's your problem, Ms. Beaton, not

mine.
MS. BEATON:
THE COURT:

I —
I have to rule correctly on it no

matter what.
MS. BEATON:

I agree. And I think that you will

rule correctly on it but I want -- I want the ability to at
least file a written motion to indicate to you why I think
that this evidence is admissible.

I also have a difficulty

because the sergeant who authorized this is on his way to
Soda Springs, Idaho where he has business, where he —
THE COURT:

I would be very liberal in you

presenting any evidence concerning the circumstances of
this —
MS. BEATON:
THE COURT:
MS. BEATON:

I understand that, your Honor —
—

blood draw.

— but I really feel like the state is

not prepared to go forward.
THE COURT: And so what are you going to do?

Do you
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is this Court's dealing with the admissibility of the test
that was blood drawn after the defendant refused to give a
test, is that correct, Ms. Beaton?
give a test when —

after he had been stopped and arrested?

MS. BEATON:
THE COURT:
chambers —

The defendant refused to

He did.
And the facts as I was told in

and by the way, I have never been asked to review

the record of the preliminary hearing, because the only thing
I was asked to review was the videotape of the officer when I
denied your motion to suppress, so the recordfs clear on
that.
MR, MCKAY:

Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT:

And I had no indication until this

morning that there was even an issue concerning the test, and
at that time there was some discussion in a chambers about
the nature of the test.

But my understanding is from what

was discussed in chambers is that the defendant was stopped
for a traffic violation, and I think as I recall, he pulled
out onto the road, made a wide turn and the officer followed
him for some distance with his light on, got up by Adams and
25th, was it, somewhere?
MR, MCKAY:

Twenty-sixth (inaudible).

THE COURT:

Somewhere around Adams. And that the

stop then took place after the officer forced him off the
road in a snow storm, so that's all I saw.

And I denied your
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taken or Mr. Cornejo was asked to lift his arm he lift his
arm and they drew the blood.

He wasn't physically struggling

but he had objected to giving a test.

Is that a correct

summary of then what happened?
MS. BEATON:

Yes, your Honor.

MR. MCKAY:

Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT:

All right.

And also Ms. Beaton gave to

the defense attorney the vitae of the blood technician
showing that she considered his proper qualifications to draw
blood and then to have it examined, and the testing
procedures, she had already given information to the defense
about what she was going to do in that regard, is that
correct, Mr. McKay?
MR. MCKAY:

You know, I don't recall receiving a

curriculum vitae but she did send to me the procedures that
they follow.
THE COURT:

And you're not arguing that --

MR. MCKAY:

That she wasn't qualified, no, your

THE COURT:

—

MR. MCKAY:

No.

THE COURT:

And Ms. Beaton, what other information

Honor.
that the technician wasn't qualified?

was given to the defense so we make a good record here about
your intent to try and show —
What else did you do?

or to get the blood test in?

You sent the curriculum vitae of the
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the officers that were involved and you were attempting to
attack the credibility of the officers because of the way
they conducted themselves toward your client, is that a fair
summary?
MR. MCKAY:

That's correct, your Honor.

As well as

the violations of their own procedures.
THE COURT:

So you were using it as a strategy to

show that aspect as well as objecting to the admissibility?
MR. MCKAY:

Correct, your Honor.

THE COURT:

And the reason you did not file a motion

to suppress this evidence was because it was part of your
strategy —
MR. MCKAY:

That!s correct, your Honor.

THE COURT:

—

MR. MCKAY:

Right.

THE COURT:

State have anything further you want to

in doing that?
Just do it during the trial.

say that you haven1t said already?
MS. BEATON:

I guess the state's position is then,

defense counsel can have all sorts of strategies if they
want, but if they want to actually have this Court suppress
evidence, it is required by Rule 12 that I actually receive
five days prior to trial written notice of that motion.

That

would have given all of us, if we would have had five days
notice, an opportunity to have researched the issue and
prepared to have even argued it this morning.
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factual findings as to why the Court does not believe the
Rule 12 would apply in this case because the word "shall" is
used -THE COURT:

Well, it's a constitutional violation of

the defendant's rights in a DUI case possibly, although I
haven't fully researched it myself and would be prepared to
rule on that within an hour or so, but it just comes to my
mind that there's certainly a constitutional issue of due
process and self-incrimination -- or involuntary
incrimination when a defendant has a right to refuse to give
a blood test in a DUI case and suffer certain consequences as
a result of that because the procedures are established on
how it is to be done.

But again, that is what initially

comes to my mind about this at least addressing the
constitutional questions of a defendant's right to due
process and the incrimination against his own desires similar
to any other incrimination.
For example, I —

I read the law as being different in a

DUI case than someone who is convicted of a crime who has to
give a test for DNA samples because there are statutory
provisions governing the one and the other as well.

I think

there are statutory provisions on voluntary testing in DUI
cases, and the exception would have to be persuasive, you
know, for any court I think to allow it in. And your
argument is that you think that it's still admissible even
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anybody that's been a prosecutor or a defense attorney runs
into these kinds of things and so itfs certainly not a fault
issue.
It's a matter of I've got a jury here ready to try the
case, we've got a defendant here ready to be tried, he's got
a right to have a speedy, public trial and this date was the
date set for a trial and both sides have to come prepared.
And this is an issue that based on -- I can see where your
assumption came from, it turned out to not be a correct
assumption because of Mr. McKay's not raising it before —
MS. BEATON:
THE COURT:

Well, I mean he said -—

and you assumed that he had the

burden to raise it and I'm saying, no, he can object to it at
trial.

That's really where that problem arises.
MS. BEATON:

But I think even when we were back in

chambers talking about this we were having a difficult time
trying to determine from Mr. McKay whether or not he was even
objecting to the admissibility when he had to -THE COURT:
know.

He could be silent about it even, you

He doesn't have that burden.

That's one of the things

about the defense's position is they have many more options
than I think the prosecution does, I really -- you know, and
that sometimes may lead to some unfairness.
MS. BEATON:
do.

But there are limits as to what he can
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charge, a third degree felony, that has nothing to do with
the DUI; there is no insurance charge, which has nothing to
do with the DUI; and there is a driving on a revoked license,
a Class B, which has nothing to do with the DUI. And I doubt
that you want to dismiss those knowing that they would be
dismissed with prejudice, because we could go ahead with
those issues before the jury.
MS. BEATON:

Well, your Honor, with —

the state's

position is, is that the state has the ability as part of
executive branch to brings charges and to dismiss charges.
If this was a situation where it appeared to the Court that
the state was doing this just to violate the defendant's
speedy trial rights, then perhaps that would be a basis for
the Court to dismiss.
THE COURT:
MS. BEATON:

/
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No, that's not — that's not the issue.

So the state's position is, is that the

state has not asked for a continuance of this trial.

The

state is prepared to go but the state now has an issue that
it does not feel like it's prepared to present at this point.
There is an alternative trial date that has already been
set because there was going to be a scheduling problem
already.

This is the first time this case has actually been

set for trial and this defendant is not in custody, so we're
not dealing with speedy trial issues involving this defendant
or the state's desire to delay.

Because as the Court has
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because we could try that and I'm not certain that the DUI
would necessarily be barred based on the fact that it's the
Court that is telling -MS. BEATON:

It would violate double jeopardy if it

came back.
THE COURT:

— you to go ahead to -- well, the

jury -- no, the jury has not been empaneled yet.
MS. BEATON:

But if we empanel the jury and I try

the evading, the driving on suspension and the no insurance
and we reserve the issue on the DUI and I move to dismiss the
DUI and for some reason the Court of Appeals agrees and they
return the DUI back to this Court, I would be precluded from
trying the DUI.
THE COURT:

Not necessarily.

So what do you want to

D'Oottiot/cm oof if* Hofj

do?
. BEATON:
fes
THE COURT:
MS. BEATON:
THE COURT:

State moves to dismiss
All of the charges?
Right.

(Unintelligible.)

You understand that this case with all

four counts, if I dismiss I feel I have to dismiss them with
prejudice because the defense is ready to proceed on them and
the reasons for the continuance are not justifiable.
MS. BEATON:

By they have to amount to

unconstitutional delay —
THE COURT:

That's in essence what you're doing is
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All right.

Then these charges are dismissed with

prejudice.
(The matter concluded.)

